

Message Text

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

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P R 041237Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 828

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 37

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 9958

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN
MINISTRY

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR

DRAFTING GROUP CIRCULATED TEXT OF PRESENTATION WHICH WILL BE
MADE BY BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE ADRIAENSSEN AT THE 5 DECEMBER
PLENARY. AD HOC GROUP AGREED ON TEXT WITH THE PROVISIO THAT
FINAL APPROVAL OF FRENCH TRANSLATION WOULD BE GIVEN AT 4
DECEMBER AD HOC GROUP MEETING. TEXT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.

MR. CHAIRMAN:
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1. IN THE LAST WESTERN PRESENTATION ON NOV 28 OUR REPRESENTATIVE
DISCUSSED THE REASONING UNDERLYING THE PROPOSALS WE TABLED
ON NOVEMBER 22. HE POINTED OUT HOW OUR PORPOSALS WERE CONSISTENT
WITH WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS,

HOW THEY MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGOTIATING EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY, AND HOW THEY WOULD ACHIEVE ENHANCED STABILITY AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY FOR ALL, WHICH ARE THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. TODAY, AND IN OUR NEXT PRESENTATION, WE WILL PRESENT SOME FURTHER VIEWS CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS TABLED ON NOVEMBER 22. I SHALL TODAY DISCUSS THE FIRST FIVE ELEMENTS OF OUR OUTLINE. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THESE TOPICS ARE: (1) AREA, (2) FORCES TO BE REDUCED, (3) THE COMMON CEILING, (4) SCOPE AND TIMING, AND (5) SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES.

3. AS REGARDS THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, OUR POSITION STATED IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS IS CLEAR AND WELL KNOWN TO YOU. I DO NOT NEED TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THIS POINT.

4. IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF OUR OUTLINE, WE PROPOSED THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED FOR YOU THE REASONS WHY IT IS APPROPRIATE TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES: GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST, MOST CONSPICUOUS AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY ARE OF DECISIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE. IT IS GROUND FORCES WHICH HAVE THE MOST DIRECT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE AREA IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED. THEY ARE BASIC TO ANY SUSTAINED MILITARY EFFORT. THEY ARE THUS THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM. A MORE EQUAL AND HENCE MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD DO MUCH TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF ANY KIND OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA. IT IS THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AGGRAVATED BY THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY, WHICH ARE FACTORS MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THAT AREA.

5. REDUCING GROUND FORCES IS ALSO THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROCEED. TO NEGOTIATE ON THEIR REDUCTION WOULD BE A WAY OF APPROACHING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A MANAGEABLE CONFIDENTIAL

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WAY. TO ATTEMPT TO TACKLE THE WHOLE RANGE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE TO RENDER THE NEGOTIATIONS UNMANAGEABLE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD RISK DELAYING AGREEMENTS INDEFINITELY.

6. THUS, TO INTRODUCE AIR FORCES INTO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COMPLICATE THEM AND HAMPER THEIR PROGRESS. ALTHOUGH MANPOWER IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS A MAJOR INDEX OF GROUND FORCE STRENGTH, THE CAPABILITIES OF AIR FORCES ARE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MEASUREMENT IN MANPOWER TERMS. EVALUATION OF THESE CAPABILITIES WOULD REQUIRE A COMPLEX AND TIME-CONSUMING DISCUSSION OF COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT AND THEIR MILITARY VALUE AS WELL AS PERSONNEL FACTORS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT.

7. MOREOVER, A REDUCTION IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE OF DOUBTFUL VALUE FOR INCREASING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY SINCE THE MOBILITY OF AIRCRAFT MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO RESTORE THEM IN A MATTER OF HOURS. TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY ADDRESSING AIR FORCES COULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATION BEYOND THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA WHICH ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED SHOULD BE THE MAIN FOCUS.

8. IN GENERAL, AN APPROACH WHICH IS BASED ON A CONCEPT OF WORKING OUT EQUIVALENTS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AIRCRAFT FOR AIRCRAFT, ITEM FOR ITEM, SEEMS TO US TO POSE A TASK OF SUCH ENORMOUS LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY THAT ITS FEASIBILITY IS QUESTIONABLE, AND WE DOUBT THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A PRACTICAL OUTCOME.

9. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO INTRODUCE THEM INTO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVEN FURTHER COMPLICATE AN ALREADY COMPLEX PROBLEM. THIS, TOO, COULD RAISE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD TAKE US BEYOND THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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10. AS AMBASSADOR QUARLES POINTED OUT ON NOVEMBER 28, THE MOST DIRECT AND EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN MAKE TOWARD REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CONVEN-

TIONAL GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES WOULD BE A MOST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD REDUCING THE RISKS OF THE OUTBREAK OF A CONFLICT WHICH COULD ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR. THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD, THEREFORE, CONCENTRATE ON CORRECTING THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS OF DISPARITY, WHICH LIE IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

11. IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT IF ONLY CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD INCREASE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASE IN THOSE WEAPONS WOULD BE LEFT OPEN. THIS TOUCHES UPON A VERY CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPORTANT POINT--AND ONE WHICH IS OF CONCERN TO THE WEST AS WELL AS TO THE EAST. BUT THIS ARGUMENT DOES NOT CORRECTLY APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES ON EACH SIDE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATION. THE PRESENT INEQUALITY IN GROUND FORCES INCREASES THE RISKS OF THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT. IT IS IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES WHICH MIGHT ALSO CAUSE CONFLICT ONE STARTED, TO ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS IS, IN FACT, ONE OF THE REASONS WHY MY COLLEAGUES AND I FEEL THAT THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS SHOULD SHARE OUR INTEREST IN REDUCING DISPARITIES AND FINDING A MORE BALANCED, MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF EITHER SIDE TO GET A FORCE-REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH AGGRAVATED EXISTING INSTABILITIES IN GROUND FORCES, THUS INCREASING THE RISK OF RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT. IF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA WERE STRENGTHENED, AS WOULD BE THE EFFECT OF OUR PROPOSALS, THERE WOULD BE NO INCENTIVE TO BUILD UP AIR OR NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA.

12. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE OUTLINED ALREADY MANY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE COMMON CEILING GOAL AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. IT IS AN EQUITABLE GOAL, FAIR TO BOTH SIDES SINCE THE NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE EQUAL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

13. IT IS ALSO A RATIONAL GOAL--ONE WHICH WILL BE ENDORSED BY PUBLIC OPINION, AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION SINCE OUR JOINT AIM IS TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVE POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US. MOREOVER, OUR PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING CONCEPT LOOKS TO THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO THE PAST. A FORCE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE PRESERVED SIMPLY BECAUSE IT HAS DEVELOPED HISTORICALLY. WE SHOULD STRUCTURE THE REDUCTIONS WITH OUR EYES UPON THEIR RESULTS. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY, WOULD CREATE A MORE STABLE SITUATION OFFERING NO MILITARY DISADVANTAGE TO ANYBODY. IT WOULD REFLECT THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN EUROPE HINGES NOT ON THE REDUCTIONS

THEMSELVES, BUT UPON THE STABILITY OF THE SITUATION THAT RESULTS FROM THESE REDUCTIONS.

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14. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD ENVISAGE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. THERE EXISTS AT PRESENT A DIFFERENCE OF NEARLY 150,000 MEN IN THE SIZE OF EASTERN AND WESTERN GROUND FORCES. THIS DISPARITY IS A SUBSTANTIAL ONE. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD ELIMINATE IT, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO GREATER STABILITY IN THE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD LEAVE THE EASTERN SIDE WITH AMPLE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND THUS NOT DIMINISH ITS SECURITY IN ANY WAY.

15. AN APPROACH CALLING FOR ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPLICATION OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS MAY HAVE A SUPERFICIAL APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY. EQUAL QUANTITY REDUCTIONS ARE EVEN MORE MISLEADING. IN REALITY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE UNEQUAL. BY FAILING TO TAKE IMPORTANT DISPARITIES INTO ACCOUNT, SUCH APPROACHES WOULD MAGNIFY THE EFFECTS OF THESE DISPARITIES ON THE MILITARY SITUATION. THESE APPROACHES LOOK ONLY AT REDUCTIONS THESELVES--RATHER THAN AT RESULTS OF THESE REDUCTIONS. IT IS, AFTER ALL, THE RESULTS AFTER REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED THAT COUNT IN TERMS OF IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD IGNORE THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF THAT WOULD BE TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY WESTERN DEFENSIVE POTENTIAL. THE WESTERN FORCES WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEFEND A LONG FRONT REACHING FROM THE SOUTH OF GERMANY TO THE BALTIC SEA, BUT THE NUMBERS OF MEN AVAILABLE FOR THE JOB WOULD BE CUT. THE IMBALANCE IN MANPOWER AND TANKS WOULD BE PRESERVED AND WOULD ASSUME GREATER IMPORTANCE AS FORCE LEVELS FELL.

17. MOREOVER, THE EASTERN APPROACH DOES NOTHING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES AND THEIR EFFECTS UPON REINFORCEMENT. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IF FORCES HAD TO BE RETURNED TO THE AREA, U.S. FORCES WOULD BE AT A GEOGRAPHICALLY IMPOSED DISADVANTAGE IN COMPARISON TO SOVIET TROOPS. MORE GENERALLY, EXISTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR REINFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD NOT BE

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FROM US REP MBFR

REDUCED. IF FORCE LEVELS WERE LOWERED BY EQUAL AMOUNTS OR BY MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF EQUAL PERCENTAGES TO ALL COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THE IMPACT OF THE UNREDUCED SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR REINFORCEMENT UPON THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION WOULD BE GREATER THAN BEFORE.

18. WE HAVE PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF OUR OUTLINE HAT REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS.

19. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT OUR APPROACH TO PHASING IS CONSISTENT WITH CONCEPTS AGREED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ADOPT AN "EFFECTIVE" APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER, "WITH DUE REGARDS TO ITS COMPLEXITY,"
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AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT "CAREFULLY" SO THAT "AT EVERY POINT" THEY WILL "CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY."

20 OUR CONCEPT OF PHASING IS AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER. THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL AND THUS A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN REACHING A COMMON CEILING. BUT THE PARTICPANTS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO GO THE WHOLE DISTANCE TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN ONE MOVE. TOO LARGE A REDUCTION IN A SINGLE STEP COULD PROVE

DESTABILIZING. IT WILL BE BOTH MORE PRUDENT AND EASIER TO REACH THE GOAL OF AN AGREED COMMON CEILING AND CONSIDERABLY SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATING TASK TO DIVIDE IT INTO TWO NEGOTIATING SEGMENTS. THUS, OUR PROPOSAL ON PHASING IS A PRACTICAL WAY TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS.

21. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE IN A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT FOR MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE STABILITY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE OVERALL SECURITY OF EUROPE. IT IS NOT MERELY "SYMBOLIC." SUCH IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED NOT ONLY BY THE PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS BUT ALSO BY INCLUSION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS OF AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND ON APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

22. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF OUR OUTLINE THAT THE FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

23. AMBASSADOR RESOR, IN PRESENTING OUR PROPOSALS ON NOVEMBER 22 OUTLINED THE MAIN REASONS WHY THIS IS NOT APPROPRIATE. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, OWING TO THEIR LARGE MILITARY RESOURCES, BEAR A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND FOR FACILITATING THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS. THUS, IT IS RIGHT THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD

TAKE THE FIRST STEP IN REDUCING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE TWO MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. MOREOVER, SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. ON THE WESTERN

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SIDE, WE SEE THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE AS INTIMATELY RELATED TO OUR CONCERN WITH SOVIET FORCES ARRAYED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME SOVIET AND US FORCES AND APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RETURN TO THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD MAKE THE GREATEST INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY. FURTHER, TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST WOULD BE FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PROCEED BY THE MOST DIRECT PATH TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND ENHANCE STABILITY. IT WOULD BE A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED AND, IN NEGOTIATIONS AS COMPLEX AS THESE, THE SIMPLEST.

24. IT WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE, OR CONDUCTIVE TO REAL PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, TO ATTEMPT AT THE OUTSET TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WITH FORCES OR TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS WOULD BE A FAR MORE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX TASK. IT WOULD HAMPER THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS.

25. ACHIEVEMENT OF A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT, ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE PROPOSED, WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT REAL PROGRESS TOWARD CREATING CONDITIONS OF ENHANCED STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD INCREASE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE IN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY PROPOSED THAT ANY REDUCTIONS OF THESE FORCES SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN A SECOND PHASE, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT IN A FIRST PHASE ON REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES AND ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ASSURANCE GIVEN BY THE FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT SUCH AS WE HAVE PROPOSED THE PARTICIPANTS WILL MOVE TOWARD A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE. INCLUSION OF FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FEASIBLE.

26. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT AS TO OUR INTEREST IN ADDRESSING THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY REACHED AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST. AS AMBASSADOR QUARLES POINTED OUT ON NOVEMBER 28, WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO EXCLUDE CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR. WE PROPOSE TO ADDRESS THE GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA AFTER FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. CLEARLY, A SECOND-PHASE AGREEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES WE HAVE PROPOSED AND WHICH WE WISH TO ACHIEVE.

27. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE SUBJECT MATTER, AS WE HAVE SO OFTEN SAID, IS COMPLEX. THE PRESENTATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE AT THIS TABLE HAVE AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THE POINT. THEREFORE, WE MUST CHOOSE THE MOST DIRECT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATH. WE MUST SEEK TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS WHERE PROGRESS IS MOST POSSIBLE AND WHERE SUCCESS WOULD BE MOST FRUITFUL. IF BOTH SIDES HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL TO INDEED IMPROVE THE SITU

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